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Deviance from social norms has been extensively examined in recent strategy research, leaving
the strategic implications of conformity largely unexplored. In this article, we argue that firms
can elect to conform to a norm along two dimensions: compliance with the goal and level of
commitment to the procedures. We then produce a typology of four norm-conforming behaviors,
which allows us to isolate differentiated effects of conformity on firm reputation. We examine
the corporate environmental disclosures of 90 U.S. firms and find that firms derive different
reputational rewards depending on whether they conform to the goal or procedure dimension
of the environmental transparency norm. In addition, the relationship between conformity and
reputation is moderated by the firm’s prior reputation and the stringency of the normative
environment. Copyright  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Social norms are powerful standards of behavior
that are rooted in widely shared beliefs about how
actors should behave. Conformity to these norms is
a central topic in several streams of literature, such
as sociology, social psychology, and institutional
theory, which all emphasize the isomorphic pro-
cesses underlying conforming behaviors. Because
deviations from accepted norms are often sanc-
tioned, social factors, such as the search for pres-
tige, status, or reputation, tend to produce behav-
ioral conformity (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Kimberly, 1967; Meyer and Rowan,
1977). A central goal of recent strategy research,
therefore, has been to examine how conformity to
and deviance from social norms may be beneficial
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or detrimental to firms. Although the strategic
aspects of deviant behaviors and their impacts on
organizational outcomes have been widely stud-
ied (D’Aunno, Succi, and Alexander, 2000; Deep-
house, 1999; Durand, Rao, and Monin, 2007;
Kraatz and Zajac, 1996), the strategic implications
of conformity have failed to trigger similar investi-
gations. Rather, conformity generally appears as a
nonstrategic, monolithic, passive response to exter-
nal or institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988;
Oliver, 1991; Zucker, 1977).
In contrast with this view, we propose a typol-
ogy of norm-conforming behaviors that reflects a
firm’s compliance with a norm’s underlying goal
and its level of commitment to adopting socially
approved procedures. We distinguish among the
conforming behaviors of abiding, strengthening,
targeting, and finessing, and investigate their rela-
tionships to firm reputation, a key mediator of
performance (Basdeo et al., 2006; Deephouse and
Carter, 2005; Durand et al., 2007; Rindova, Pol-
lock, and Hayward, 2006). To conduct this study,
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we selected a domain imbued with a high degree
of normativity, namely, corporate environmental-
ism, defined as ‘the recognition and integration
of environmental concerns into a firm’s decision-
making process’ (Banerjee, 2002: 177). Corporate
environmentalism is a relevant field in which to
explore our research question because, in recent
decades, normative pressures regarding environ-
mental responsibility have increased dramatically
(Bansal, 2005; Bansal and Clelland, 2004).
Our approach reveals differentiated impacts of
the four conforming behaviors on firm reputa-
tion. Both dimensions of norm conformity—goal
compliance and procedural commitment—can sig-
nificantly affect outside observers’ reputational
assessment and ordering of firms. Specifically,
we find that both types of behaviors that com-
ply with the goal of environmental friendliness
(i.e., abiding and strengthening) enhance firm rep-
utation. Regarding noncompliant disclosures, we
find that finessing behavior tends to be insignifi-
cant, whereas targeting behavior, contrary to our
expectations, contributes positively to reputation.
We also find that the level of procedural com-
mitment amplifies the positive effect of goal-
compliant disclosures on reputation. Furthermore,
we find that a firm’s prior reputation acts as a
filter for current evaluations of its disclosures,
such that firms with lower prior reputation receive
greater benefit from strengthening and targeting
behaviors. Finally, we find a significant moderating
effect of the institutional environment in which the
reputation-granting evaluation occurs. In highly
normative environments, goal-oriented conformity
has precedence over procedural conformity, and
goal-noncompliant disclosures are penalized.
These findings suggest several contributions to
extant literature. First, we contribute to recent strat-
egy research that investigates the impacts of firms’
conformity to and deviance from norms on key
organizational outcomes. In this study, we find a
way to delve deeper, both theoretically and empir-
ically, into the concept of conformity to provide
a more nuanced and strategic understanding of
conforming behaviors. Second, we contribute to
literature on reputation by developing insights into
the evaluative logics that underlie the reputation-
granting process. Third, we contribute to research
on corporate environmentalism through our empir-
ical investigation of the impacts of environmental
disclosures on firm reputation.
THEORY POSITIONING AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Social norms, conformity, and firm reputation
A social norm is a powerful behavioral standard
whose function is to summarize the behavior of
a reference group or category (Warren, 2003) by
specifying what is approved within the group and
what ought to be done in a given setting (Reno,
Cialdini, and Kallgren, 1993). Together with indus-
try standards, social norms work as decentral-
ized institutions (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005)
because conformity by actors is voluntary (i.e.,
actors can choose to deviate) and because rewards
and sanctions for conformity or deviance are pro-
vided by diffuse actors rather than by a central
authority (Ingram and Silverman, 2002).
Although recent research has focused on the
strategic aspects of deviant behaviors and their
impacts on key organizational outcomes (e.g.,
D’Aunno et al., 2000; Deephouse, 1999; Durand
et al., 2007; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), conformity
to social norms has failed to trigger similar atten-
tion. Specifically, the strategic aspects of con-
forming behaviors have been overlooked, leav-
ing conformity to be described as a nonstrategic,
passive response to institutional pressures on the
firm (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991). Early insti-
tutional literature emphasized conformity’s roots
in the taken-for-granted aspects of institutional
rules (Zucker, 1977), and later studies shifted that
focus to how conformity could be induced by
its survival value within the institutional environ-
ment (e.g., Dobrev and Ozdemir, 2006; Lee and
Pennings, 2002). In strategy literature, conformity
is often regarded as a synonym for similarity;
for example, the concept of ‘strategic conformity’
refers to the extent to which a firm’s behavior
adheres to its industry’s norms and central ten-
dencies (Deephouse, 1996; Geletkanycz and Ham-
brick, 1997) and emphasizes the isomorphic pro-
cesses that underlie conforming behaviors. Prior
studies have neither theoretically nor empirically
addressed the potentially heterogeneous behavioral
patterns that conformity may encompass. As a con-
sequence, conformity to social norms is usually
studied in a monolithic fashion.
However, social norms specify both valued ends
and the procedures deemed appropriate to pursue
those ends. When a firm conforms to a norm,
procedures and ends have no need to be aligned
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perfectly (Beckert, 1999; Goodrick and Salancik,
1996), which makes possible a disjunction between
the two dimensions. Merton (1967) argued that
every social group couples its desired goals with
the institutionalized procedures for attaining those
goals, and though the goals and procedures oper-
ate jointly, the two dimensions do not entail con-
stant relations. More recent works have also sug-
gested that the procedures may not always be
fully imposed, either because they are unspecified
(Beckert, 1999) or because acceptable alternative
procedures are available for conforming to social
expectations (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). When
procedures are not fully specified or multiple pro-
cedures seem socially acceptable, discretion can be
exercised, and firms can pursue their own particu-
laristic and strategic interests. In turn, we posit that
socially approved goals and procedures may even
be entirely disjointed. For example, in a highly
normative context, a firm may selectively conform
to one aspect of the norm without conforming
to another. That is, conformity to a social norm
may be an expression of strategic intent that firms
can use purposefully to develop varied behavioral
patterns.
When investigating how conforming and deviat-
ing behaviors may benefit or harm firms, scholars
tend to focus on either classic organizational out-
comes, such as performance and survival (e.g.,
Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), or
external evaluations by third parties (e.g., Durand
et al., 2007; Love and Kraatz, 2009). We adopt the
second perspective and focus on firm reputation
because conformity (or deviance) tempers a firm’s
external perceptions before influencing its perfor-
mance (Deephouse, 2000; Durand et al., 2007;
Fombrun, 1996). Reputation refers to the percep-
tions by a firm’s audience about the firm’s abil-
ity to provide value compared with its peers and
rivals. We follow Basdeo and colleagues (2006:
1205) to define reputation formation as ‘a signal-
ing process, in which the strategic choices of firms
send signals to observers and observers use these
signals to form impressions of these firms.’ Out-
side observers scrutinize and interpret the firm’s
actions and, on the basis of these actions, eval-
uate the firm’s underlying but unobserved key
characteristics (Basdeo et al., 2006; Fombrun and
Shanley, 1990; Heil and Robertson, 1991; Rindova
et al., 2006). A strong reputation is a key resource
that provides firms with strategic advantages at
both the asset and market levels and represents an
important antecedent of firm performance and ulti-
mate survival (Deephouse 2000; Fombrun, 1996;
Rindova et al., 2006).
Decomposing conformity: impacts of goal
compliance and level of commitment
We investigate the impacts of various conforming
behaviors on firm reputation in the context of cor-
porate environmentalism (Banerjee, 2002), which
has grown over the past two decades into a ‘norma-
tive institutional pillar’ and a ‘matter of social obli-
gation’ (Hoffman, 1999: 363, italics in original).
Responsible environmental practices have become
essential to a firm’s relationships with its audience,
and social expectations regarding the degree to
which firms should assume responsibility for pro-
tecting the natural environment have significantly
increased (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Hoffman,
1999). These societal concerns contribute to the
emergence of social norms pertaining to the envi-
ronmental realm (Banerjee, 2001, 2002; Hoffman,
1999).
One such norm is corporate environmental trans-
parency. Because firms are accountable for the
impacts of their activities on the natural environ-
ment, they are expected to integrate environmen-
tally friendly practices into their activities. How-
ever, outside observers continue to have difficulty
in measuring and assessing the actual extent of
firms’ environmental performance directly (Bansal,
2005; Baron, 2001). To reduce information asym-
metries, firms are thus expected to follow the
norm of corporate environmental transparency by
communicating on their environmental behavior
through timely and transparent reports of the
impacts of their activities on the natural envi-
ronment. These environmental disclosures provide
insights into the firms’ management quality while
also enabling an assessment of both their degree
of risk exposure and the extent of their environ-
mental performance (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998;
Deegan, 2002; King et al., 2005).
We conceptualize environmental communication
as an institutional mechanism that dispenses norm
conformity signals to firms’ audiences and define
environmental disclosures as those ‘that relate to
the impact company activities have on the phys-
ical or natural environment in which they oper-
ate’ (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000: 16). Firms that
choose to disclose information about their envi-
ronmental behavior engage in proactive attempts
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to align with their institutional environment and
emphasize the congruence between their own val-
ues and actions and those deemed appropriate by
society (Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Con-
sidering the powerful isomorphic pressures associ-
ated with norms and values (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Scott, 2001), conformity to the corporate
environmental transparency norm should result in
a reputational gain (Basdeo et al., 2006; Fombrun,
1996).
Despite the greater salience of this norm, how-
ever, very limited legal requirements regulate the
environmental information firms must release and
how they should release it. Disclosing environmen-
tal information thus remains mostly discretionary.1
Although all firms that disclose environmental data
in their corporate communication can be labeled
conforming actors, we argue they do not consti-
tute a homogeneous category but instead exhibit
varied conforming behavioral patterns. We inves-
tigate these variations along the two dimensions of
goal compliance and employed procedures.
The ‘goal dimension’ of a norm specifies the
objectives approved by society (e.g., Merton,
1967). In the context of environmental trans-
parency, this dimension addresses the nature of
the information firms should be disclosing (i.e.,
the content of disclosure). The socially approved
goal underlying the transparency norm specifies
that firms must disclose information that demon-
strates their environmental friendliness, such as
their efforts to reduce their ecological footprint.
The content of environmental disclosures, how-
ever, may vary: firms may release environmen-
tal information that shows a reduction of their
ecological footprint (e.g., fewer emissions, use of
recycled materials, or certification of products or
processes), but they could also disclose informa-
tion that reveals an increase in that footprint (e.g.,
polluting events, or suits and fines related to vio-
lations of environmental regulations). In the latter
case, firms conform to the environmental trans-
parency norm by releasing information on their
environmental behaviors but fail to comply with
the underlying goal of environmental friendliness.
1 According to widely accepted accountability principles, firms
must disclose their environmental liabilities in their financial
statements. In practice, however, the extent of a firm’s liability at
the moment of the infraction is highly uncertain, which provides
the firm with significant discretion regarding the content and
timing of the disclosure (Bansal and Clelland, 2004).
The ‘procedures dimension’ of a norm pre-
scribes the desirable procedures for complying
with the socially approved goal (Merton, 1967).
In the context of environmental transparency, this
dimension refers to how firms should disclose the
required information (i.e., the mode of disclosure).
Because the norm does not specify a unique mode
of communication and because socially acceptable
alternatives coexist (e.g., annual reports, environ-
mental stand-alone reports, and Web sites), firms
can choose among different modes of disclosure.
All modes of communication pertain to the realm
of socially desirable procedures, but they exhibit
different levels of commitment to the norm (i.e.,
different degrees of environmental transparency).
By evaluating firm behaviors with respect to
both their compliance with the socially approved
goal and their level of commitment to the proce-
dures, we derive four categories: abiding behav-
iors, strengthening behaviors, targeting behaviors,
and finessing behaviors. Actions that comply with
the socially approved goal but exhibit a lower
level of procedural commitment refer to abiding
behavior . Although these behaviors comply with
expectations of environmental friendliness, they do
not demonstrate strong adherence to the procedu-
ral aspect of the social norm, and therefore do not
contribute to reinforcing it. Instead, these actions
simply abide by the behavioral standard.
Actions that both comply with the socially
approved goal and exhibit a high level of commit-
ment toward the procedures reflect strengthening
behavior . These behaviors demonstrate the con-
gruence of the firm’s actual actions with the behav-
ior expected of it, and this congruence is made
visible through the firm’s high level of procedural
conformity. By conforming to both dimensions of
the norm, these behaviors contribute to strength-
ening it.
Next, we refer to actions that do not comply
with the socially approved goal but display a
high level of procedural commitment as targeting
behaviors. These behaviors fall short of the social
expectation of environmental friendliness, but the
high level of commitment shows that the firm
explicitly acknowledges the disjunction between
its current actions and what is expected from it
as a margin of progress.
Finally, actions that fail to comply with the
social expectations and exhibit low levels of proce-
dural commitment are labeled finessing behaviors.
For these behaviors, conformity to the norm of
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 Compliance with socially approved goal 
Level of
procedural
commitment
Yes No
High Strengthening behavior Targeting behavior
Low Abiding behavior Finessing behavior
Figure 1. Typology of norm-conforming behaviors
environmental transparency persists at a low level
(i.e., the firm discloses environmental informa-
tion about an increased environmental footprint),
but the disjunction between the firm’s actual and
expected actions is hidden from scrutiny. Figure 1
summarizes this typology of behaviors conforming
to a social norm.
By disclosing environmental information, the
firm provides reputation granters with information
they can use to assess the extent of the firm’s envi-
ronmental friendliness, which should result in a
reputational gain. However, when a firm releases
information about its environmental behavior, it
might provide either positive information about
its environmental performance or negative infor-
mation about its environmental liabilities (Bansal
and Clelland, 2004). In both cases, the firm con-
forms to the norm of environmental transparency.
Yet, if in the first case, the firm also demonstrates
its compliance with the socially approved goal of
environmental friendliness and signals that it actu-
ally cares for the environment, in the second case,
it fails to comply with the expectations of environ-
mental friendliness. Firms in the former group (i.e.,
those displaying strengthening or abiding behav-
ior) should therefore earn social rewards, whereas
firms in the latter group (i.e., those displaying tar-
geting or finessing behavior) should be socially
penalized and should therefore not benefit from
a positive reputation effect (Bansal, 2005; Bansal
and Clelland, 2004; King and Lenox, 2000). We
therefore predict:
Hypothesis 1a: Strengthening and abiding
behaviors have a positive effect on firm repu-
tation.
Hypothesis 1b: Targeting and finessing behav-
iors have a negative effect on firm reputation.
Similar to the variations marking the content
of the disclosures, variations also mark the dis-
closure procedures. We argue that some modes of
communication may be perceived as signals of bet-
ter quality both because they are more costly and
thereby imply greater commitment to the norm by
the emitters (Spence, 1974) and because they allow
outside observers to more easily assess the credi-
bility and authenticity of the disclosed information
(Heil and Robertson, 1991). As the importance that
firms grant to the norm provides a behavioral iden-
tity marker to outside observers (Elsbach, 2004),
this level of commitment may categorize firms
according to their degree of cognitive and identity-
based adherence to the norm, in other words,
according to their degree of conformity. A high
level of commitment implies both a strong adher-
ence to the norm and a high level of conformity
with the socially approved procedures, whereas a
lower level of commitment demonstrates a mini-
mal level of conformity and is merely sufficient to
avoid being stigmatized. Using procedures that are
socially desirable increases perceptions that firms
have internalized the values and requirements asso-
ciated with engaging in responsible environmental
behavior (Bansal and Clelland, 2004).
In the context of goal-compliant behaviors,
exhibiting higher adherence to the norm should
amplify perceptions of conformity with the envi-
ronmental transparency norm. It then follows that
the benefits associated with conformity should
also be amplified. We suggest firms that have
recourse to socially approved procedures asso-
ciated with higher levels of commitment (i.e.,
strengthening behavior) obtain positive distinc-
tiveness from other firms and should thus derive
greater rewards than firms that rely on proce-
dures associated with lower levels of commitment
(i.e., abiding behavior). A similar line of reasoning
applies to goal-noncompliant behaviors because
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the positive distinctiveness of socially valued pro-
cedures benefits the firm’s reputation. A high level
of commitment toward the norm should thus buffer
the negative impression conveyed by the discrep-
ancy between the firm’s actual behavior and social
expectations, such that firms exhibiting a high level
of commitment without complying with social
expectations (i.e., targeting behavior) are likely to
be less penalized than are firms that do not com-
ply with these expectations and conceal it through
a low level of commitment (i.e., finessing behav-
ior). These latter firms are likely to be categorized
as passive conformers and to suffer greater penalty
than firms that display targeting behavior. Thus, we
suggest high procedural commitment has an ampli-
fying effect on firm reputation (for goal-compliant
conformity) and a buffering effect on firm reputa-
tion (for goal-noncompliant conformity):
Hypothesis 2a: Strengthening behaviors have a
greater positive effect on firm reputation than do
abiding behaviors.
Hypothesis 2b: Targeting behaviors have a
lesser negative effect on firm reputation than do
finessing behaviors.
Moderating impact of prior reputation on the
evaluative process
The strong institutional pressures to adopt environ-
mentally friendly practices entail the production
of abundant, convergent, and highly standardized
discourses. In such a context marked by high
ambiguity and uncertainty, audiences cannot eas-
ily verify information and are thus likely to use
screening devices to assess the credibility of firms’
disclosures. Research has suggested that audiences
tend to use prior reputation as a baseline from
which to interpret and assess a firm’s actions (Heil
and Robertson, 1991; Durand and McGuire, 2005;
Love and Kraatz, 2009). To the extent that a high
reputation can be considered a trustworthy reflec-
tion of a firm’s pattern of behaviors over time,
reputation-granting audiences may be willing to
rely on the firm’s prior reputation to assess the
quality of its disclosures. Prior reputation, thus,
may be an important moderator of the reputation-
granting process because it not only provides an
indicator of the firm’s past performance and relia-
bility but also serves as a heuristic to evaluate the
extent of the firm’s credibility, that is, the extent
of the firm’s adherence to the norm.
Firms with lower social evaluations suffer
stronger pressures to conform to social norms
(Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001), and they likely
receive rewards for aligning their behavior with
audiences’ expectations. Because the amount of
effort to align behavior is proportionally greater
for firms with below average reputations, we
expect that for these firms, the positive effect of
compliant behaviors will be magnified. Regard-
ing noncompliant behaviors, previous research
has documented that firms benefiting from high
social evaluations are in some ways buffered
from the negative effects of their deviance from
social norms (e.g., Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001).
On the contrary, firms with lower social evalua-
tions are more likely to be sanctioned if they do
not respect socially appropriate behaviors. Bansal
(2005) showed that firms that have previously
incurred fines—and thereby suffered from an exist-
ing reputation deficiency—were more likely to be
subject to greater scrutiny regarding the possibil-
ity of further mishaps. For a firm that has a lower
reputation, disclosing information that does not
comply with expectations of environmental friend-
liness should, therefore, trigger greater sanctions.
Overall, we expect that a lower level of prior rep-
utation amplifies the merits (penalties) of disclos-
ing goal-compliant (goal-noncompliant) informa-
tion, and we suggest:
Hypothesis 3a: The positive effect of strengthen-
ing and abiding behaviors on firm reputation is
stronger for firms with lower prior reputation.
Hypothesis 3b: The negative effect of targeting
and finessing behaviors on firm reputation is
stronger for firms with lower prior reputation.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample and data
To investigate the causal relationships between
environmental disclosures and firm reputation, we
conducted an empirical analysis with a longitudi-
nal dataset for the years 2001 to 2004. We chose
this period for two reasons. First, the proxim-
ity of the Enron scandal and its aftermath con-
ferred unprecedented salience on corporate social
responsibility issues (e.g., accounting, financial,
and environmental transparency). Second, on a
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strictly environmental level, corporate environ-
mental issues started to receive much more atten-
tion after the Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002.
We thus expected corporate environmentalism to
be more salient in firms’ communication during
this period of time.
We explore our research question using a cross-
industrial sample of firms belonging to 11 differ-
ent sectors.2 We randomly selected 90 U.S. firms
present in at least three consecutive years of For-
tune magazine’s annual survey of ‘America’s Most
Admired Companies.’ These firms are the largest
U.S. competitors in their sectors.
The data for this study were derived from sev-
eral sources. We first focused on the firms’ annual
reports because, among the various external corpo-
rate communication media that a firm may employ,
annual reports represent a strategic communica-
tion tool that firms mobilize to convey infor-
mation that may legitimize their behavior in the
opinion of outside observers (Brown and Deegan,
1998; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). This goal is
particularly significant in the context of environ-
mental communication. The United States insists
on few obligatory environmental disclosures—the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which requires
companies to publish the details of their chemi-
cal emissions into the air, water, and land, and
the disclosure of environmental performance data
in firms’ 10-K reports. Every environmental dis-
closure outside this frame thus falls within the
province of firms’ strategic attempts to influence
outside observers’ perceptions (Ullmann, 1985).
Therefore, the annual report offers a particularly
interesting source of information to study a firm’s
strategy, notably with regard to its environmental
management (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Sharma
and Henriques, 2005; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).
We collected a total of 306 annual reports (due to
missing data for some years), of which 233 con-
tained environmental disclosures.
Parallel to our collection of the annual reports,
we retrieved corporate stand-alone reports on envi-
ronmental responsibility, sustainable development,
social responsibility, and environmental health and
2 The sample is partitioned as follows: 8.9 percent financial
industry, 10 percent consumer products, 4.4 percent contracted
services, 7.8 percent shelter, 13.3 percent stores and distributors,
8.9 percent computers and communication, 11.1 percent natu-
ral resources, 8.9 percent power, 6.7 percent precision equip-
ment, 4.4 percent media and entertainment, and 15.6 percent
transportation.
safety issues that contained information about
firms’ environmental performance. Although the
initiative for releasing an environmental report
originally came from the most polluting indus-
tries (e.g., chemical and petrochemical sectors),
this behavior has spread to other industries. Again,
there is no legal obligation to publish an environ-
mental report, but choosing to do so represents
a valuable opportunity for the firm to communi-
cate strategic data about its environmental behav-
ior to outside observers. Note that the data con-
tained in the stand-alone environmental report and
in the narrative sections of the annual report are
not audited by third parties (unless required and
explicitly specified by the firm). We collected 53
stand-alone environmental reports; only 22 percent
of the firms in our sample released such reports.
Finally, we consulted the COMPUSTAT database
to collect information on firm performance. Over-
all, our dataset tracks 90 firms over a four-year
period. However, because data were not available
for all firms in all years, and because we use
lagged variables, the actual total number of firm-
year observations is 282.
Dependent variables
In strategy and organizational literatures, most
studies that analyze firms’ corporate reputation
employ Fortune magazine’s reputation scores,
published with its list of ‘America’s Most Admired
Corporations’ (Basdeo et al., 2006; Brown and
Perry, 1994; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Love
and Kraatz, 2009; Roberts and Dowling, 2002).
This reputation survey, released in March each
year, is based on the answers of some 10,000
executives, directors, and financial analysts who
have been asked to rate Fortune 1000 firms in
their industry on a range of dimensions that reflect
how well they fare in terms of asset use, financial
soundness, community and environmental friendli-
ness, ability to develop key people, degree of inno-
vativeness, investment value, management quality,
and product quality.3 Each dimension is rated on
an 11-point scale (0 = poor, 10 = excellent). Using
the averaged aggregation of these eight scores,
the survey determines the firm’s overall reputation
score, which similarly ranges from 0 to 10. These
3 See Fortune, ‘World’s Most Admired Companies: how we pick
them,’ http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/
2009/faq/for a review of the data collection procedure.
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raw scores are then used to rank firms and build
reputational orders within each industry.
Fortune magazine’s reputation measure suf-
fers from significant shortcomings. The most fre-
quently mentioned limitations are its strong associ-
ation with financial performance, the strong corre-
lation between the eight reputation subscales, its
focus on large and visible firms, and the non-
representative nature of the audiences it surveys
(Brown and Perry, 1994; Fombrun and Shanley,
1990; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Gardberg and Fom-
brun, 2002). We used it, however, because this
measure also offers key advantages, such as the
assessment of reputation on the basis of several
criteria, the longitudinal availability of the data,
and the coverage of a large number of firms. In
addition, our study explores perceived reputation
for established firms in the business sphere, which
attenuates the measure’s shortcomings of respon-
dents’ homogeneity and ignorance of small firms.
Following prior studies (e.g., Roberts and Dowl-
ing, 2002), we measured overall reputation as the
raw score of reputation (i.e., the score averaged
across the eight dimensions). Some works suggest
however, that firms may be more concerned about
improving their relative standing than their actual
raw score (e.g., Elsbach and Kramer, 1996), which
is consistent with the intrinsically relational nature
of the reputation concept (Love and Kraatz, 2009).
We thus also used an intraindustry relative posi-
tioning measure (i.e., a within-industry ranking),
ranked reputation. Based on Fortune magazine’s
published ranking of firms, we created an inverted
ranking, ranging from 10 for the top-ranked firm in
a given industry to 0 for the lowest-ranked. Thus,
covariates that enhance reputation will have posi-
tive signs for both dependent measures. Following
prior studies that investigate changes in reputation
(e.g., Durand et al., 2007; Love and Kraatz, 2009),
we included the prior year’s reputation score or
rank in our models. The independent variables’
coefficients in our models thus indicate their year-
to-year effects on reputational change.
Independent variables
We built our independent variables around the dif-
ferentiated nature of firms’ environmental disclo-
sures on the basis of both their compliance with
the socially approved goal and their level of com-
mitment. We analyzed firms’ annual reports (nar-
rative and financial sections) and environmental
stand-alone reports and coded for the presence of
environmental disclosures. Except for one case in
which we relied on a binary variable, we used ordi-
nal measures of firms’ environmental disclosures.
Because the richness (i.e., the quality and level
of precision) of the disclosures is more likely to
influence perceptions of outside observers than is
their mere presence, an ordinal measure based on
a fine qualitative assessment seemed more appro-
priate than a dichotomous partition.
First, we defined disclosures according to their
level of commitment by identifying the modes of
communication chosen to disclose the environmen-
tal data. Because firms have significant discretion
in this choice, we posited that the selection of
a specific medium (i.e., annual vs. stand-alone
report) reflected the firm’s degree of adherence to
the transparency norm. Specifically, releasing envi-
ronmental information in the annual report should
indicate a lower level of commitment to the trans-
parency norm than does publishing a document
entirely dedicated to the firm’s environmental per-
formance. Although the annual report is one of
the most common places to encounter environ-
mental reporting, such environmental disclosures
often lack specificity and scarcely extend beyond
the mere declaration of intentions. Moreover, the
dissemination of environmental information within
the narrative and financial sections of the annual
report makes it more difficult for the audience to
identify whether the firm is simply abiding by the
disclosure norm or more eagerly committed to be
fully transparent in its environmental behavior. In
contrast, a stand-alone environmental report rep-
resents an effective management tool to increase
transparency with regard to the firm’s environ-
mental performance through the disclosure and
discussion of performance indicators. Because the
visibility of the disclosed data is greater than in the
annual report, firms that choose to publish stand-
alone environmental reports implicitly accept the
cost of increased social scrutiny. The more visible
the communication mode, the more the firm will be
held accountable for the disclosed information. We
thus defined the level of commitment toward the
norm as high if the firm disclosed environmental
information within a stand-alone report and low if
the information appeared within the firm’s annual
report.
Second, we defined disclosures that complied
or did not comply with the socially approved
goal of environmental friendliness. Goal-compliant
Copyright  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 969–993 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
The Impact of Norm-Conforming Behaviors on Firm Reputation 977
disclosures mention achievements in the firm’s
efforts to reduce its ecological footprint (e.g.,
environmental certification of products or pro-
cesses, environmental training of employees, spon-
sorship of environmental causes, and reduction
of carbon-based emissions) and thus demonstrate
the firm’s environmentally friendly orientation. In
contrast, goal-noncompliant disclosures allude to
damages suffered by the natural environment (e.g.,
oil spills and violations of environmental regula-
tions), which indicates deviance from the socially
approved goal of environmental friendliness.
We then created four variables corresponding
to the four behaviors described in the typology.
Although we used sentences as the basis of our
coding scheme to determine whether a disclosure
was goal compliant or noncompliant, the score for
each independent variable was built at the level
of the communication medium. However, as we
discuss in the section on multiple disclosures, our
coding procedure takes into account and integrates
the presence of potentially varied or diverging dis-
closures within a single communication medium.
The Appendix contains both a summary of the cod-
ing scheme we used to measure these independent
variables and verbatim examples.
Abiding behavior consists of goal-compliant dis-
closures located in annual reports. The score equals
0 when no such disclosure appears in the firm’s
annual report, 1 when environmental issues are
tackled in vague and broad terms, 2 when the infor-
mation is specific to the firm and gives precise
information about the environmental dimension at
stake, and 3 when the information is firm specific
and illustrated by qualitative or quantitative exam-
ples, or both.
Strengthening behavior consists of goal-
compliant disclosures located in stand-alone
reports. Because the readers of environmental
stand-alone reports likely are more sensitive to
environmental issues than are the average read-
ers of annual reports, we expected the environ-
mental data provided within these reports to be
more detailed and more specific than similar data
incorporated in annual reports. Therefore, we did
not replicate the coding scheme used for abid-
ing disclosures but instead developed a different
measure that equals 0 when there is no such dis-
closure in the firm’s stand-alone report and 1 when
the environmental information disclosed consists
of qualitative data with few metrics. To ensure
optimal transparency, data need to be contextu-
alized. Consequently, the variable equals 2 when
the stand-alone report contains metrics that track
multiyear trends (for comparisons at the intraorga-
nizational level over time) and either provide back-
ground information or use a Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI) disclosing procedure (for benchmark-
ing with other firms). Finally, the variable equals
3 if the metrics track multiyear trends and provide
background information and the firm either dis-
closes its environmental information following the
GRI procedure or discusses its listing in the Dow
Jones Sustainability Index.4
Targeting behavior refers to goal-noncompliant
disclosures published in stand-alone reports. Sim-
ilar to our treatment of strengthening and abiding
behaviors, we coded this variable from the least
preferred option (0) to the most desirable option
(3). Therefore, the variable equals 0 when a sim-
ple mention is made of an environmental incident,
notice of violation, or fine without any other con-
textual element; 1 when the incident is qualita-
tively described but without mention of corrective
actions; and 2 when the report includes qualitative
mentions of the incident and a detailed discussion
of corrective actions. Finally, because according to
the goal of environmental friendliness the highest
preference is for a firm not to increase its ecolog-
ical footprint, the absence of disclosures mention-
ing environmental damages is coded 3.
Finessing behavior refers to goal-noncompliant
disclosures located in annual reports. When coding
for the presence of these finessing disclosures,
we noted that they were systematically located in
financial statements or 10-K reports. Consequently,
these disclosures took the form of short mentions
of environmental fines and penalties for failing to
conform to environmental regulations. Because we
could not derive an ordinal measure from these
data, we used a binary variable, in which finessing
4 The GRI’s goal is to ensure transparent and comparable disclo-
sures of sustainability information. It provides outside observers
with a standardized comparable structure from which to under-
stand disclosed information. Firms can adopt this structure on
a voluntary basis. For further information, see the GRI Web
site, located at http://www.globalreporting.org/Home. The Dow
Jones Sustainability Index rates firms on their corporate sustain-
ability (economic, environmental, and social factors) according
to a set of criteria and ranks them within their industry. Only the
industry leaders are selected to be part of the Dow Jones Sustain-
ability Index. For more information, see Dow Jones, ‘Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes,’ at http://www.sustainability-index.com/.
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behavior equals 0 when no such disclosures are
made and 1 when such disclosures are present.
During the coding process, we encountered two
different cases of multiple disclosures. First, when
we identified disclosures of different quality lev-
els (i.e., specificity) within a single report, we
retained the highest score. For example, if a firm’s
annual report contained goal-compliant disclosures
(i.e., abiding behavior) that were vague (coded
1) and others that were specific and illustrated
by examples (coded 3), the variable received a
final value of 3. Second, we identified disclo-
sures of different natures (i.e., both goal-compliant
and goal-noncompliant behaviors) within a single
report. The firm then received a score for each
type of disclosure. For example, in a stand-alone
report in which the firm simultaneously disclosed
(1) specific data about its efforts to reduce its
ecological footprint using a GRI procedure and
(2) detailed descriptions of an environmental inci-
dent with mentions of corrective actions, the firm
would earn a score of 3 for strengthening behavior
and 1 for targeting behavior.
To ensure the internal validity of the coding
process, the two authors and a third scholar not
involved in the study coded the material indepen-
dently. Specifically, the first author coded all the
material, and the other two coders each addressed
20 percent of the dataset. To determine interrater
agreement regarding the presence of environmen-
tal disclosures and the qualitative nature of these
disclosures, we used the kappa statistic, equal to
0 when there is complete disagreement and 1
when the evaluators share perfect agreement. Lan-
dis and Koch (1977) suggested that kappa statistics
greater than 0.60 represent good agreement among
observers; the interrater agreement regarding the
presence of environmental disclosures reached a
kappa statistic greater than 0.85 for all instances
but one (0.80). For the disclosures’ coding, the
kappa statistic was also greater than 0.85 for all
instances but three. For any discrepant ratings,
we easily came to an agreement and reached full
consensus.
Control variables
Environmental issues do not exhibit the same
salience and importance across all industries and
years, so we controlled for such variability by
adding two sets of variables. We used industry
dummies to account for differences in industry sen-
sitivity to environmental issues, and we included
year dummies to control for interyear variability.
Age, size, and performance may relate positively
to reputation (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse and
Carter, 2005), so we included these aspects as con-
trol variables. Because longevity is an antecedent
of reputation, the length of time a firm has
been in business may positively influence outside
observers’ evaluations. Therefore, we introduced
the variable of age as the logged number of years
a firm had been operating. The size of an organiza-
tion also may affect its visibility and relationships
with its environment (Deephouse, 1996). We mea-
sured this variable as a yearly logged measure of
total assets as listed on COMPUSTAT, such that
the size variable indicates the variation from one
year to the next. Finally, because superior financial
performance may predispose audiences to assess
a firm more positively (Fombrun and Shanley,
1990), we used the two-year averaged return on
assets as a proxy of performance and collected the
appropriate information from COMPUSTAT.
Our model deals exclusively with disclosures
from sources internal to the firm, though media
coverage might affect a firm’s reputation (Fom-
brun and Shanley, 1990) in terms of both visibil-
ity (i.e., amount of information released about the
company) and content (i.e., negative vs. positive
tone of press articles). Consistent with studies that
suggest the media actively participate in construct-
ing the social realities they cover (Clayman and
Reisner, 1998; Rindova et al., 2006), we thus con-
trolled for the possible impact of information inter-
mediaries on audiences’ perceptions and assess-
ments of firms. From Lexis-Nexis, we retrieved all
articles mentioning the environmental behavior of
the firms within our sample from 2001 to 2004 by
searching for documents that contained the major
terms environment or environmental. Articles that
did not use these words in relation to the natural
environment were excluded. This sampling pro-
cedure yielded 2,156 pertinent articles about the
90 firms of our sample. Following the procedure
advocated by Deephouse and Carter (2005), we
identified and coded the recording units according
to each article’s description of the firm’s environ-
mental behavior. We attributed equal weights to
each recording unit and then rated it as either posi-
tive or negative regarding the firm’s environmental
behavior. A unit was positive when it mentioned
past or present actions in compliance with the
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socially approved goal of environmental friendli-
ness. When the unit indicated goal-noncompliant
environmental behavior, we rated it as negative.
Next, we created annual measures for each firm
using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance,
which taps the relative number of positive (p) and
negative (n) mentions of a firm’s environmental
behavior in a given year using the formula:
media tonality =
{
(p2 − p.n)/(p + n)2 if p > n;
0 if p = n; and
(p.n − n2)/(p + n)2 if n > p.
Media tonality ranges from −1 to 1, where
−1 indicates all negative coverage, 1 equals all
positive coverage, and 0 is a balance between
the two. We also computed coverage intensity to
capture the magnitude of impact of having more
articles than less, independent of their tonality.
Hence, coverage intensity is the log of (p + n)
for each year and each firm.
Analyses
We first investigated whether the decision to com-
municate was randomly attributable to companies
because environmental communication and firm
reputation might depend jointly on unobserved
factors, which would raise issues of endogeneity
(Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998).
We thus estimated the probability of communi-
cating in a first-stage equation, and included this
estimation in a second-stage equation that predicts
reputation. We tested whether a systematic differ-
ence in coefficients existed between the two-stage
model and a model without this specification test.
The test proved insignificant, which suggests a low
presence of bias due to endogeneity in our mod-
els. However, since audiences may differ in their
expectations of which firms are likely to commu-
nicate and in their subsequent reputational assess-
ments, we created an indicator for a firm’s yearly
probability of communicating on environmental
issues. The probability of communication equation
had the following lagged covariates: industry, year,
age, yearly change in size, yearly change in per-
formance, existence of an environmental section in
the firms’ Web site, change in coverage intensity,
and media tonality. The probability of communi-
cation variable is the predicted value that results
from this equation, which we included as a control
in our models and should relate positively to our
dependent variables.
Our data involve 90 firms over four years
and thus created two major violations of ordi-
nary least squares models. First, regressions per-
formed on time-series data mean the errors may
not be independent. Errors are often autocorre-
lated, such that each error correlates with the
error that immediately precedes it. Second, cross-
sectional time-series panel data raise concerns
about panel heteroskedasticity. Ordinary regres-
sion models assume that the errors have the same
variance throughout the sample, but if the error
variance is not constant, the data are heteroskedas-
tic. Both the Durbin-Watson and Wooldridge tests
indicate the presence of autocorrelation in our data,
and the likelihood ratio (LR) test for heteroskedas-
ticity is significant.
Following Greene (2003), we thus used cross-
sectional time-series feasible generalized-least
squares (FGLS) regression. We also conducted
panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates
for linear cross-sectional time-series models. When
computing the standard errors and variance-
covariance estimates, we assume the disturbances
are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously corre-
lated across panels. The FGLS and PCSE esti-
mators are β-consistent, and, therefore, only the
standard deviations change (which are smaller for
PCSE). The results are similar, so for simplicity we
present only the FGLS results. We rejected poten-
tial issues related to multicolinearity among the
explanatory variables by using a variance inflation
factor test and mean-centering all variables before
creating the interaction terms (Cohen et al., 2003).
RESULTS
Main results
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and
correlations among the variables used to test the
hypotheses. Note that the correlations among the
main effects are not problematic.
Table 2 presents the models that explain the rep-
utation scores (in Models 1–3) and rankings (in
Models 4–6). Models 1 and 4 include only the
control variables, while Models 2 and 5 add the
main effects for testing the impact of conforming
behaviors on a firm’s reputation score and rela-
tive ranking. Models 3 and 6 add interaction terms
between the four conforming behaviors and prior
reputation scores (in Model 3) and rankings (in
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Model 6). Following previous studies (Allison and
Christakis, 1994; Love and Kraatz, 2009), we also
used rank-ordered logistic regression analyses to
test our hypotheses on the reputation-ranking vari-
able. This technique, which we present in Model
7 as a confirmatory analysis that replicates Model
6, is designed specifically for contexts in which
the dependent variable is a relative ranking of
objects within a group (Love and Kraatz, 2009).
As we report in Table 2, the results obtained from
the FGLS and rank-ordered logit are substantively
similar.
Among the significant controls, we observe that
increases in firms’ size have a significantly neg-
ative impact on reputation score (Models 1–3).
The path-dependent effect between prior and cur-
rent reputations is of a magnitude similar to that
observed in previous studies (e.g., Durand et al.,
2007; Love and Kraatz, 2009). In Model 4, the
intensity of media coverage marginally increases
the reputational ranking, which supports the idea
that media exposure is positively linked to repu-
tation. Similarly, the probability of communication
measure is favorably associated with increases in
reputation scores and rankings across the seven
models.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that goal-compliant
conformity (i.e., strengthening and abiding behav-
iors) would increase firm reputation, whereas
Hypothesis 1b proposed that goal-noncompliant
conformity (i.e., targeting and finessing behav-
iors) would decrease it. In support of Hypothesis
1a, Models 2 and 3 show that both strengthen-
ing and abiding behaviors have a significant posi-
tive effect on a firm’s reputation score (p < 0.001
for strengthening conformity in both models; p <
0.05 for abiding conformity in Model 2). Mod-
els 5 to 7 indicate a significant and positive effect
of strengthening conformity on the firm’s reputa-
tion ranking (p < 0.05 in Models 5 and 7; <0.01
in Model 6). However, the coefficients for abid-
ing behavior are either not significant or negatively
oriented in Models 5 to 7, indicating that the posi-
tive effect of abiding behavior does not materialize
directly as an improved ranking. Overall, the pos-
itive effect of goal-compliant conformity on repu-
tation stated in Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported
for strengthening behavior on both the reputation
score and rank; however, for abiding behavior, this
support pertains only to the reputation score.
Regarding goal-noncompliant conformity, the
effect of finessing behavior on a firm’s reputation
score is statistically insignificant across the models
(except for a marginally significant and positive
effect in Model 5). Yet targeting behavior has a
significant and consistent positive effect on reputa-
tion score (Models 2 and 3 p < 0.01) and ranking
(Models 5 and 6 p < 0.01; Model 7 p < 0.05)
that contradicts our prediction. Therefore, the neg-
ative effect of goal-noncompliant conformity that
we predicted in Hypothesis 1b does not receive
support from our results.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b proposed that a high
level of procedural commitment would amplify
the positive effect of goal-compliant conformity
and buffer the negative effect of goal- noncom-
pliant conformity on firm reputation. On the goal-
compliant side, we thus expected a greater positive
effect of strengthening behavior compared with
abiding behavior. In Model 2, the Wald test of
coefficient equality indicates a significant differ-
ence between the two coefficients (chi2 = 4.43,
p = 0.03), which confirms the greater coefficient
value of strengthening behavior. The test achieves
convergent results for Models, 3, 5, and 6, in sup-
port of Hypothesis 2a. On the goal-noncompliant
side, we expected a lesser negative effect of tar-
geting behavior compared with finessing behavior,
and again we find a significant difference in Model
2 (chi2 = 8.29, p = 0.004): Consistent with our
prediction, targeting behavior deteriorates reputa-
tion significantly less than does finessing behavior,
even beyond the expected effect, because the coef-
ficient for targeting behavior is significantly posi-
tive. We observe the same effect across the other
models. Overall, Hypothesis 2b is supported by our
results.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that a firm’s
prior reputation would moderate the relationship
between conformity and reputation. We tested this
effect with the interaction terms between the four
conforming behaviors and prior reputation, which
we measured as the firm’s reputation score or
ranking in the previous year. Model 3 shows a
negatively significant interaction effect between
strengthening behavior and prior reputation score
(p < 0.05) and between targeting behavior and
prior reputation score (p < 0.10). The other two
coefficients of the interaction terms are not statisti-
cally significant. Model 6 displays a positively sig-
nificant interaction effect between abiding behav-
ior and prior reputation ranking (p < 0.01) and
a negatively significant interaction effect between
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Figure 2. Interaction effect of strengthening behav-
ior and prior reputation (centered values) on a firm’s
reputation
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Figure 3. Interaction effect of targeting behavior and
prior reputation (centered values) on a firm’s reputation
strengthening behavior and prior reputation rank-
ing (p < 0.10).
To illustrate these results, we plotted the mod-
erating effects of prior reputation on strengthening
behavior (see Figure 2) and on targeting behav-
ior (see Figure 3), on the basis of the coefficient
estimates in Model 3. Figure 2 shows that strength-
ening behavior benefits firms with lower prior rep-
utation more than firms with higher prior reputa-
tion, which supports Hypothesis 3a. In contrast,
Figure 3 indicates that the presence of targeting
behavior makes a positive difference in the pre-
dicted values for low ranked firms, which diverges
from the prediction of Hypothesis 3b. The graphi-
cal representation of the moderating effect of prior
ranking on abiding behavior (unreported) further
reveals no obvious difference in the predicted val-
ues between high or low prior reputation rankings.
Although these results suggest a moderating effect
of prior reputation on the relationship between
conforming behaviors and reputation, they provide
limited support for Hypothesis 3a and no support
for Hypothesis 3b.
Additional models and robustness checks
In this section, we offer additional insights into
the reputation-granting process. Some findings
from Table 2 indeed suggest that some contex-
tual effects, not captured in our main models,
might interact with the social evaluation of behav-
iors conforming to the environmental transparency
norm. A key contextual factor in the normative
domain we study is the strength of the categorical
imperative facing firms. A categorical imperative
constrains actors to fit into specific categories, such
that their actions are interpreted through a com-
parison with socially accepted role performances
(Zuckerman, 1999). A stronger categorical imper-
ative induces higher pressures to conform and
more stringent norms. Differences in the categori-
cal imperative strength may thus result in reputa-
tion granters valuing the four conforming behav-
iors differently. We therefore proceeded to perform
additional tests (see Tables 3 and 4), in which we
manipulated the level of the categorical imperative
in two different ways. Through these two manip-
ulations, we aimed to increase the stringency of
expectations on the firm and the overall normative
degree of the environment in which the reputation-
granting process occurred.
First, because reputation refers to the beliefs
of various audiences regarding the likelihood that
the firm will deliver value along specific dimen-
sions (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999; Rindova et al.,
2006), it is assessed at the level of these dimen-
sions (e.g., the ability to deliver products on
time, human resources management, or environ-
mental stewardship). A general reputation score,
such as Fortune magazine’s score, simply repre-
sents the aggregation of these dimension-specific
evaluations into a more global level of analysis.
We thus conjectured a higher categorical impera-
tive of the environmental transparency norm—and
thus a stricter evaluation of conformity to this
norm—if the firm’s reputation was assessed at
the environmental dimension level rather than at
the global level. To address this issue, we repli-
cated Model 2 after replacing the overall reputation
score with the Fortune score obtained by that firm
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Table 3. Conforming behaviors and environmental rep-
utation: results of FGLS analyses
N=282 Environmental reputation
Model 8 Model 9
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes no
Size −0.775∗∗∗ −0.893∗∗∗
(−9.63) (−17.11)
Age −0.0241 0.0698∗
(−0.52) (2.45)
Performance −0.0109∗ −0.00586
(−2.42) (−1.50)
Prior reputation 0.542∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(14.72) (19.83)
Media tonality −0.0357 −0.0456
(−1.12) (−1.56)
Coverage intensity −0.0193 0.0525∗
(−0.57) (2.48)
Probability of
communication
2.108∗∗∗ 0.108
(6.49) (0.70)
Abiding behavior 0.0955∗ 0.195∗∗
(2.32) (2.64)
Strengthening
behavior
0.211∗∗ 0.139+
(2.78) (1.64)
Finessing behavior −0.0316 −0.0930+
(−0.56) (−1.88)
Targeting behavior 0.0801 0.251∗∗∗
(0.99) (3.96)
Industry sensitivity −0.178+
(−1.78)
Abiding behavior
× industry
sensitivity
−0.0488
(−0.59)
Strength behavior
× industry
sensitivity
0.321∗∗∗
(3.41)
Finessing behavior
× industry
sensitivity
0.0760
(0.67)
Targeting behavior
× industry
sensitivity
−0.177∗
(−2.11)
5.853∗∗∗ 5.536∗∗∗
Constant (7.58) (9.09)
chi2 1346.6∗∗∗ 1046.0∗∗∗
t-values are in parentheses.
p-values: + p < 0.10; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
on the community and environmental friendliness
dimension (see Table 3, Model 8). In spite of this
measure’s strong correlation with the global repu-
tation score, we believe it offers an interesting tool
to assess evaluations of conformity to the envi-
ronmental transparency norm in a more stringent
normative context.
Second, we suspected that some industry-level
effects might occur in which the norm of cor-
porate environmentalism would be more strin-
gent in some industries than others. We addressed
this issue by computing a binary environmental
sensitivity measure, industry sensitivity based on
the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem (NAICS) codes for environmentally sensitive
industries.5 The variable was coded 1 if the firm’s
NAICS code belonged to this list (e.g., oil and gas
extraction, mining, chemical manufacturing, trans-
portation equipment manufacturing, or computer
and electronic product manufacturing) and 0 other-
wise. We then generated interaction terms between
this measure and the four conforming behaviors,
which we added in a new model (see Table 3,
Model 9).
Model 8 displays a pattern of results similar
to that observed in Model 2. Both goal-compliant
behaviors (i.e., strengthening and abiding) have a
significant positive impact on environmental rep-
utation, and finessing behavior remains insignif-
icant. In this model, however, the coefficient of
targeting behavior becomes insignificant, whereas
in the previous models it was significant and posi-
tive. These results may indicate that high proce-
dural conformity is less valued than goal com-
pliance when the categorical imperative is high.
As expected in Model 9, the direct effect of
industry sensitivity is negative, indicative of lower
reputation averages for firms operating in envi-
ronmentally sensitive industries. Model 9 shows
a positively significant interaction effect between
strengthening behavior and industry sensitivity
(p < 0.001) and a negatively significant interac-
tion effect between targeting behavior and indus-
try sensitivity (p < 0.05). The other two interac-
tion effects are not statistically significant. These
results seem to indicate that in highly normative
5 The NAICS is the standard used by federal agencies to clas-
sify business establishments. We based our coding on the envi-
ronmentally sensitive industries list that was developed by the
Small Business Administration based on the NAICS codes. This
list can be consulted at: www.504corporation.com/documents/
NAICSCodes.pdf
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Table 4. Means comparison of predicted values of environmental reputation (based on estimates from Model 9)
INDUSTRY SENSITIVITY Difference of means
High Low
STRENGTHENING Behavior Presence 6.75 6.05 ∗∗
Difference of means Absence 5.66 5.63 n.s
∗∗∗ n.s
ABIDING Behavior Presence 6.42 6.02 ∗
Difference of means Absence 5.50 5.61 n.s
∗∗ +
TARGETING Behavior Presence 5.90 5.65 ∗∗
Difference of means Absence 5.65 5.66 n.s
∗∗ n.s
t-tests: + p < 0.10; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
environments, the simultaneous presence of goal
compliance and high procedural commitment sig-
nificantly increases firm reputation, whereas the
absence of goal compliance deteriorates it, even
in the presence of high procedural commitment.
Table 4 displays the mean comparisons for the
predicted values in the presence (absence) of con-
forming behaviors and industry sensitivity. These
complementary analyses show that the presence of
strengthening behavior is more valued in indus-
tries with strong environmental concerns than in
less environmentally sensitive ones (difference
of means statistically significant at p < 0.01).
These analyses also indicate that the absence of
such behaviors in environmentally sensitive indus-
tries is more heavily penalized and thus leads
to lower environmental reputation scores (differ-
ence of means statistically significant at p < 0.01).
These observations suggest that in situations in
which the categorical imperative is high, strength-
ening behavior has a stronger positive impact on
reputation. Table 4 also shows that the presence
of abiding behavior in an environmentally sensi-
tive industry leads to an environmental reputation
score of 6.42, whereas the presence of targeting
behavior leads to an average score of 5.90. This
result suggests that abiding conformity is the sec-
ond most rewarding conforming behavior in terms
of reputation and thus that the value granted to
goal compliance supersedes the value granted to
procedural commitment.
In addition to the main models and additional
tests reported here, we conducted several robust-
ness checks. For example, we used different esti-
mation procedures. As previously discussed, we
replicated our FGLS analyses with a PCSE
procedure (for all main models). We also repli-
cated the models after removing the probability of
communication measure. Moreover, we conducted
alternative analyses in which the dependent vari-
ables were the variation of reputation score and
ranking in place of the raw score and ranking used
in our main analyses. Finally, we ran alternative
models in which the four conforming behaviors
were dichotomous variables capturing the absence
or presence of environmental disclosures. All these
alternative analyses produced results very similar
to those of the main models (with some control
effects becoming significant, such as media tonal-
ity and coverage intensity), and all hypotheses sup-
ported in Tables 2 and 3 received at least marginal
support from these additional models. The con-
vergence of these different analyses confirms the
robustness of our results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this study is twofold. We set out
to identify different conforming behaviors and to
empirically examine their differentiated impacts
on firm reputation. In so doing, we contribute
to recent strategy research that investigates the
positive and negative impacts of firms’ conformity
to and deviance from social or industrial norms on
key organizational outcomes (e.g., Durand et al.,
2007; Love and Kraatz, 2009; Sirmon and Hitt,
2009).
Conformity as a heterogeneous construct
Prior works on conformity tend to share a mono-
lithic conception of this concept. In institutional
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literature, for example, conformity to social norms
is discussed in a holistic fashion, based on the
assumption that the valued ends and the means
to pursue those ends are perfectly aligned. Oliver
(1991), in her discussion of possible organizational
responses to institutional pressures, mentions three
alternative forms of conformity: habit, imitation,
and compliance. However, these three forms do not
encompass different conforming behaviors, as she
suggests, but instead refer primarily to the different
motivations (i.e., blind adherence, mimetic acqui-
escence, and conscious obedience) that cause firms
to conform to social or industrial norms. In the end,
the observable behavior remains identical, regard-
less of the underlying motivation. Similarly, in
strategy literature, conformity is often equated with
similarity and isomorphism. As a consequence,
conformity’s potentially heterogeneous nature has
not been adequately addressed.
Here, we provide an account of the heteroge-
neous nature of conformity through a typology of
four conforming behaviors that we contrast along
two dimensions: compliance with the goal of envi-
ronmental friendliness and level of commitment to
the appropriate disclosing procedures. The empir-
ical findings support our theory that conformity is
not a monolithic variable by emphasizing how both
dimensions of conformity affect outside observers’
reputational assessments and ordering of firms.
An important implication of this result is that
by adopting a fine-grained perspective on con-
formity, we can better investigate empirically the
differentiated effects of conforming behaviors on
firm reputation. We show that both behaviors that
comply with expectations of environmental friend-
liness (i.e., strengthening and abiding) enhance
firms’ reputational score and ranking, as we pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 1a. As stated in Hypothesis
2a, we also find an amplifying effect of the level
of commitment to procedures on the positive effect
of goal-compliant conformity. That is, the posi-
tive reputational valence of strengthening behavior
supersedes that of abiding behavior. However, for
the behaviors that conform to the environmental
transparency norm but fail to comply with expec-
tations of environmental friendliness (i.e., targeting
and finessing), we do not find the predicted nega-
tive effect on firm reputation. The coefficients for
finessing behavior are not significant, but those of
targeting behavior have a consistently significant
positive effect on both reputation score and rank-
ing. Although this result contradicts Hypothesis
1b, it provides empirical support for the buffer-
ing effect of the level of procedural commitment
predicted in Hypothesis 2b. These results suggest
that under its apparent passive and uniform sur-
face, conformity encompasses a varied nature of
conforming types that firms can use strategically.
Conformity as a strategic behavior
Because actors are expected to conform (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983), and conformity is the most fre-
quently encountered behavior, prior research has
largely suggested that it is a passive, nonstrate-
gic response to institutional pressures and has thus
focused instead on deviant behaviors. In this study,
we adopt a different perspective and suggest that
conformity can also be the expression of a strate-
gic intent. Specifically, we argue that firms have
some degree of leeway and choice in how they
conform to the norm, which leads to variations in
their conforming behaviors. Although all firms that
disclose information regarding their environmen-
tal behavior are conforming to the environmental
transparency norm, they can customize the content
of their disclosures and their level of commitment
to the appropriate means of disclosures. This argu-
ment has two interrelated important implications
for strategy.
First, by suggesting that firms can selectively
conform to one dimension of the norm without
conforming to the other, we grant them some
discretionary power over the degree to which
they choose to conform. Following Goodrick and
Salancik (1996), Deephouse (1999), and Durand
et al. (2007), we thus combine institutional and
strategic choice perspectives by considering firms’
agency without dismissing the constraints imposed
on them by prevailing institutional expectations.
Rather, we argue that firms may choose appropri-
ate actions according to their strategic interests but
that these choices remain bounded by institutional
expectations. This argument is in line with emerg-
ing research on institutional work (e.g., Bascle and
Arndt, 2008; Davis and Marquis, 2005; Lawrence
and Suddaby, 2006) that emphasizes the purpo-
sive action of firms to create, maintain, or disrupt
institutions.
Second, a central concern of this study is to
examine how firms disclosed information to
improve their reputation score and relative stand-
ing. Our results suggest the possibility of opti-
mal configurations of conforming behaviors, which
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implies that firms should strategically conform to
goals and procedures to reap higher payoffs. The
results in Table 4 indicate that firms showing evi-
dence of strengthening behavior can achieve a
reputation score on average 11.5 percent higher
if they belong to an environmentally sensitive
industry compared with less sensitive industries
(6.75 compared with 6.05). If firms do not dis-
play strengthening behavior, however, their repu-
tation score reaches only 5.66 (cf. 5.63 for firms in
less sensitive industries). These results imply that
the presence of strengthening behavior earns more
rewards in contexts with high categorical imper-
atives than in less normative environments (0.70
differential score). The results also indicate that
the absence of strengthening behavior is propor-
tionally more damaging to reputations in strong
categorical imperative contexts (1.09 differential
score) than in weaker ones (0.42 differential score).
Similarly, the value of strengthening behavior rel-
ative to the value of abiding behavior is greater
in contexts of strong categorical imperatives (0.33
differential score) than in a less normative environ-
ment (0.03 differential score). We interpret these
results as indicating a lower discretionary power
of firms when the categorical imperative increases,
such that the firms become more constrained by
the institutions in which they are embedded. Con-
sequently, both the discretion to engage in the
most constraining conforming behaviors and the
ensuing benefits vary significantly across firms and
industries.
Evaluative logics and the reputation-granting
process
This study contributes to literature on reputation
building by providing insights into the reputation-
granting process and, specifically, the evaluative
logics that observers rely on to interpret signals
and grant reputation. Prior works have suggested
that reputational assessments depend partly on the
firm’s conformity to socially constructed standards
of behavior (e.g., Love and Kraatz, 2009; Staw
and Epstein, 2000). As previously discussed, a core
finding of this study is that conformity to norms
may take on different forms, which are differently
rewarded by reputation-granting audiences. These
results emphasize that audiences may be atten-
tive to different signals and thus rely on multiple
evaluative logics to ascribe reputation. The overall
pattern of results suggests an additional contribu-
tion that belies the apparent intuitiveness of the
main finding. As evidenced by the tests of our
moderating hypotheses and as emphasized in our
additional models, reputation-granting assessments
are contextually situated.
First, consistent with prior research (Heil and
Robertson, 1991; Durand and McGuire, 2005;
Love and Kraatz, 2009), we find that reputa-
tion granters evaluate firms’ disclosures through
the prism of their prior reputation. For exam-
ple, strengthening and targeting behaviors are
more rewarded for firms with lower prior rep-
utations. These results may indicate that less
reputed firms receive amplified returns on their
high level of conformity—to either the underlying
goal or the appropriate procedures—as compensa-
tion for the proportionally greater amount of effort
they display to align their behavior with social
expectations.
Second, although audiences may conjointly
employ multiple logics to ascribe reputation, they
will typically give precedence to one, depend-
ing on the context of their evaluation. In highly
normative contexts specifically, the value of goal
conformity seems to supersede that of procedu-
ral conformity, and reputation-granting audiences
rely more on a goal-oriented evaluative logic than
on a logic that is procedure oriented. For instance,
the additional models show that finessing behavior,
which was consistently nonsignificant in Table 2,
becomes negative in Models 8 and 9. Similarly, the
coefficient for targeting behavior, which was pos-
itive and significant in former models, becomes
nonsignificant in Model 9. These results suggest
that the absence of goal-compliant conformity in
highly normative environments (even in the pres-
ence of high commitment to procedures) tends
to be penalized by reputation-granting audiences,
which resonates with the limited body of research
that suggests conformity does not always benefit
firms (e.g., Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Phillips
and Zuckerman, 2001). These results are rein-
forced by observations in Table 4 indicating that,
in highly normative contexts, abiding behavior is
more rewarded than targeting behavior.
We can interpret these findings in light of the
ongoing debate about symbolic vs. substantive
conformity (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal
and Zajac, 2001). Many scholars have shown that
decoupling substantive and symbolic behaviors is
a real risk for norm-based institutions, and we
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acknowledge the potential for information manip-
ulation in the normative field we investigate. How-
ever, this study explores how outside observers
perceive the firm’s environmental performance
when relying on their disclosures, which leads us
to focus on the symbolic dimension of conformity.
Perceived environmental performance is thus suf-
ficient for our purpose, even in the absence of sub-
stantive actions. Whereas it is generally assumed
that the symbolic management of a norm proves
sufficient to secure audiences’ approval, we show
that audiences discriminate among different types
of symbolic conformity: firms that conform to the
goals and firms that commit on procedures. When
the categorical imperative is strong, audiences tend
to give precedence to goal compliance over pro-
cedural commitment. A first implication of these
results is that the evaluative logics employed by
reputation granters and, accordingly, the reputa-
tional valence of the conforming behaviors differ
in relation to the normative stringency of the envi-
ronment. A second implication is that disconnect-
ing goals from procedures is easier when the cat-
egorical imperative is lower and when firms enjoy
greater discretionary power.
Corporate environmentalism and reputation
Finally, this study contributes to literature on cor-
porate environmental communication and fills an
important gap by providing one of the first empir-
ical examinations of the impact of environmental
communication on firm reputation. Although some
prior research has investigated the relationships of
corporate environmental communication to envi-
ronmental performance (Clarkson et al., 2008) and
to financial performance (Bansal and Clelland,
2004; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994), minimal
attention has centered on a systematic exploration
of empirical relationships between corporate envi-
ronmentalism and reputational gains. Our findings
suggest that environmental communication influ-
ences both environmental and general perceptions
of a firm, not just perceptions of the firm as an
environmental friendly entity, with potentially dif-
ferentiated impacts.
In turn, this study is relevant to managers,
because it provides incentives to monitor com-
petitors’ environmental policies and to carefully
manage their own environmental communications.
The nature of the information disclosed, the mode
of communication used to release the environmen-
tal information, and the association between these
dimensions influence firms’ reputation scores and
rankings. Environmental disclosures thus must be
fine-tuned according to the firm’s prior reputa-
tion and the normativity of the environment in
which it operates. Finally, our findings suggest that
in environmentally sensitive industries, procedural
conformity increases reputation only when coupled
with evidence of goal-conforming activities. Firms
belonging to these industries should thus seek to
improve their substantive environmental actions so
they can adequately communicate those actions
and thereby reap the afferent reputational benefits.
Limitations of the study and concluding
remarks
Despite these contributions, some limitations of
this study deserve mention. First, although oper-
ationalizing disclosures as ordinal variables offers
richer measures than would dichotomous parti-
tions, the arbitrary choice of a one-degree incre-
ment numbering may be discussable because of
the difficulty of assigning a specific impact value
to each type of disclosure. However, such a num-
bering allowed us to account for the fact that the
perceived value of disclosures is determined on the
basis of their specificity. As previously discussed,
although Fortune magazine’s reputation measure
offers key advantages, it suffers from significant
shortcomings. Another limitation of this study is
its reliance on a single source to assess reputa-
tion, whereas the reputation concept is theorized as
the aggregation of multiple perceptions and assess-
ments. To reduce the impact of these shortcomings,
we controlled for prior reputation and performance
and for autocorrelation problems. We also dealt
with established firms, which helped to dampen
the biases that could be introduced to our mod-
els by differences in size, sector membership, or
resource endowment.
Despite a recent proliferation of reputational rat-
ings based on economic or social performance
from business publications (e.g., Fortune, Forbes,
Financial Times), social rating agencies (e.g., the
Council on Economic Priorities and Innovest
Strategic Value Advisors), and investment funds
(e.g., Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini and SAM),
reputation measurement remains a vexing problem.
A strong need thus exists for a better measure of
corporate reputation that will not be crippled by
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biases. Such an instrument should be consistently
replicated across years to allow for longitudinal
analyses and should encompass several criteria to
respect the multidimensional nature of reputation.
Also, to correct for an overemphasis on finan-
cial criteria, the ideal measure should incorporate
the evaluations of multiple stakeholders and not
just those of financial analysts or senior managers.
Finally, to allow for better representativeness, this
measure should encompass a wider coverage and
not focus exclusively on the biggest and most visi-
ble firms. Despite some steps in this direction (e.g.,
the Harris-Fombrun Corporate Reputation Quo-
tient), much work remains to be done.
To conclude, this study takes an important step
toward developing a more fine-grained picture of
conformity and its link to the reputation-building
process. It advances understanding of the strate-
gic nature of conformity by empirically identify-
ing and disentangling the differentiated impacts
of conforming behaviors on firm reputation in the
context of corporate environmentalism. Firms can
choose strategically how much they conform to a
norm and to which part of that norm they will
conform. Our results indicate that these conform-
ing behaviors are differently rewarded, depending
on the conforming behavior, the firm’s prior rep-
utation, and the level of categorical imperative it
confronts.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Coding scheme
Goal-compliant disclosures Goal-noncompliant disclosures
STRENGTHENING BEHAVIOR TARGETING BEHAVIOR
0. Absence 0. Mention of incident, notice of violation, or fine
1. Mainly qualitative data with few metrics 1. Qualitative description of incident
2. Longitudinal metrics or GRI reporting
procedure
2. Qualitative description of incident and detailed
discussion of corrective actions
3. Longitudinal metrics and GRI reporting
procedure or Dow Jones Sustainability Index
3. Absence
ABIDING BEHAVIOR FINESSING BEHAVIOR
0. Absence 0. Absence
1. Vague mention 1. Presence
2. Firm-specific mention
3. Firm-specific mention with qualitative or
quantitative examples, or both
Table A2. Illustration of the coding scheme for abiding behavior
0 Absence
1 Vague mention ‘Cooper Cameron is keenly aware of the social, environmental
and economic impacts the company’s operations can have on
the variety of locations where we do business.’ (Cooper
Cameron, 2004)
2 Firm-specific mention ‘The Cooper Cameron HSE council (. . .) provides leadership and
oversight for the company’s efforts in addressing local, national
and international rules and regulations.’ (Cooper Cameron,
2002)
3 Firm-specific mention with qualitative or
quantitative examples, or both
‘In 2004, for the fifth consecutive year, 100 percent of our farms
in Latin America earned Rainforest Alliance certification on the
basis of scheduled and surprise annual audits.’ (Chiquita, 2004)
Table A3. Illustration of the coding scheme for targeting behavior
0 Mention of incident, notice of violation,
or fine
‘Company-owned plants included in this report had 13 notices of
violation, and paid fines or other penalties of $107,410 in
2002.’ (Coca-Cola, 2002)
1 Qualitative description of incident ‘The incident in Toledo refinery in the US, when almost
800,000 litres of diesel fuel leaked into a sewer, was the
largest.’ (BP, 2003)
2 Qualitative description of incident and
detailed discussion of corrective
actions
‘During 2001, we had two accidental spills, each less than five
liters, of hydraulic oil into the water. In both cases, we took
corrective action, including modification and enforcement of the
planned maintenance system.’ (Chiquita, 2002)
3 Absence
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